Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern AuthoritiesCallan, Charles J. (Charles Jerome)
Religion
Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities
Callan, Charles J. (Charles Jerome)
Christian ethics -- Catholic authors
(b) When the law forbids something, it is possible that one does not
will the omission commanded and yet fulfills one’s obligation. Example:
He who intends to eat meat on a day of abstinence which he thinks is
a meat day, but, being unable to find what he wants, omits the meat,
satisfies the law, which requires only that one omit what is forbidden
and have no will to violate the law.
(c) When the law commands that an act be performed, one must perform
the act willingly, since the law being for humans intends that
fulfillment be made in a human manner. Examples: He who is dragged
to church and forcibly detained there during Mass, does not satisfy
the law of sanctifying the Sunday, since force makes his assistance
at Mass involuntary (see 52). A child that goes to church only to
escape punishment satisfies its duty, if, in spite of reluctance, it
really intends to hear Mass, for fear does not necessarily make an act
involuntary (see 41 sqq.).
477. As to the intention required in fulfilling a law, it is to be
noted that one must have, at least implicitly, the intention of doing
what the law prescribes, in the case given in the third section (c) of
the preceding paragraph. Example: He who goes to church on Sunday while
Mass is being said with no other purpose than that of hearing the music
or of waiting for a friend, does not satisfy the Sunday duty, since he
does not at all intend to hear Mass.
478. The following kinds of intention, though to be recommended, are
not necessary for the fulfillment of a law.
(a) It is not necessary, as a rule, that one intend to satisfy one’s
obligation, for human lawgivers have not generally the power or the
intention to command acts that are purely internal (see 374, 426).
Examples: He who hears Mass on a holyday not intending to perform his
duty, as he does not know that it is a holyday, has satisfied the law.
He who says the rosary out of devotion and then remembers that he has
an obligation of saying it because of a promise made or of a penance
received, can regard the rosary said as a fulfillment of his obligation.
(b) It is not necessary that one intend that which the lawgiver had in
mind as the purpose of the law; for “the end of the law is not a part
of the law.” Example: A person who takes only one full meal during
Lent, observes the letter of the law; but he misses its spirit if he
eats or drinks greedily, daintily or copiously, in order to avoid the
mortification intended by the law.
479. If one intends to perform what a law prescribes, but at the
same time expressly intends not to satisfy, by that performance,
the obligation imposed, one’s act is sufficient or insufficient for
fulfillment according to the source from which the obligation arises.
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