(c) Compensationism is not intended as a system to be applied by those who have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for moralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear from the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted principle of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend it and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized its necessity. 739. Practical Conclusions.--From the foregoing discussions one may deduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert theologians: (a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly convinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous doubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you need not hesitate to follow your conscience. (b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the acceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended assent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but seek truth and decision. (c) If your state of conscience is opinion (i.e., the acceptance of what you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or another competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for any course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience, 611 sqq.). 740. Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems of conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn: (a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a “Meliorist,” for the better and more perfect is more advisable than what is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to aspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it should not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in higher station higher things are required. (b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a “Certitudinist,” that is, one must resolve doubts or slight probabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above in 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a Tutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in 661). (c) As between the safer and the less safe, one must be a Tutiorist, when some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme rights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679). (d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a Probabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil suits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697). (e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general moral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681). (f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary probable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is free to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.