Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern AuthoritiesCallan, Charles J. (Charles Jerome)
Religion
Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities
Callan, Charles J. (Charles Jerome)
Christian ethics -- Catholic authors
(b) Joy about things that are sinful or consequent on sin rejoices, not
that what was done was wicked, but over other circumstances that were
good or indifferent. Examples: An employer admires in the conduct of a
dishonest employee, not the injustice committed, but the shrewd manner
in which the fraud was perpetrated. A bystander is very much amused to
witness a fight, not because he likes discord, but because the acts and
remarks of the fighters are comical. A man rejoices when he hears that
a friend has committed suicide and made him his heir, if the joy is
confined to the second part of the news.
238. The moral gravity and species of evil rejoicing has the same
character as the past sins that are its object (see 70 sqq.). For to
rejoice over sin is to approve of it, and therefore to be guilty of it
in will. Example: A prisoner who, to overcome melancholy, thinks over
the times he became intoxicated in the past, is guilty again of those
sins, with their number and circumstances adverted to.
239. What has been said about evil rejoicing applies likewise: (a) to
boasting over sin committed, because this implies complacency in the
sin; (b) to sorrow over sin omitted, because this means that one
approves of sin rather than virtue.
240. To be sorry because one performed good that was not obligatory is
not sinful of itself, but it may become so by reason of the evil motive
of the sorrow, or of the danger of sin. Examples: If a person is sorry
that he performed many unnecessary devotional exercises, because he
injured his health thereby, his sorrow is not sinful. If he grieves
over this because he now dislikes religion, his sorrow is made bad by
his evil motive. If he regrets that he married, this is sinful if it
leads him to neglect the duties of his state and commit injustice.
241. Evil desires are acts of the will by which one deliberately
intends to commit sin in the future. They are of two kinds, viz.,
absolute and conditional: (a) absolute or efficacious desires are those
in which the mind is fully made up to carry out the evil design, come
what may; (b) conditional or inefficacious desires are those in which
the purpose to commit sin hinges upon the fulfillment of some event or
circumstance that is explicitly or implicitly willed.
242. Absolute evil desires have the same moral gravity and species as
that to which they tend (i.e., they take their character from the
object, end and circumstances). Example: He who plans to steal a large
sum from a benefactor in order to be able to live in idleness and
dissipation, sins gravely against justice, and is also guilty of
ingratitude and intemperance, for he has committed all these sins in
his heart.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account