Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern AuthoritiesCallan, Charles J. (Charles Jerome)
Religion
Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities
Callan, Charles J. (Charles Jerome)
Christian ethics -- Catholic authors
258. Danger of sin is the likelihood that it will be committed in
certain circumstances. It is of two kinds, proximate and remote. (a)
Danger of sin is proximate, when there is moral certainty that in given
circumstances sin will be committed, either because the generality of
mankind falls in such cases (absolute danger), or because in them a
particular individual has always fallen (relative danger). Examples:
Associating with depraved persons is a proximate danger of sin for
anyone, since it is a matter of universal experience that evil
associations corrupt good morals. Taking strong drink is a proximate
danger for one who has never imbibed moderately in the past. (b) Danger
of sin is remote, when the likelihood that sin will be committed is not
morally certain, and does not exclude a serious and well-founded
probability or expectation to the contrary. Example: There is remote
danger in an occasional drink, if a person who had several times
relapsed into intemperance, has practised abstemiousness for years.
259. Possibility of sin is the conceivability but unlikelihood that it
will result from a certain set of circumstances. Example: Attention to
business sometimes makes a man avaricious, practices of piety may
degenerate into hypocrisy, etc., but there is no natural connection
between industry and devotion, on the one hand, and greed and
insincerity, on the other hand. Sin follows naturally from its danger,
but only accidentally from its possibility.
260. It is not lawful imprudently to expose oneself to the danger of
sin, since it is manifestly against reason to risk spiritual loss
without cause. The character of the sin of him who does this differs
according to circumstances. (a) He who rashly exposes himself to the
proximate danger of grave sin, or to what he foresees will become
proximate danger, is guilty of grave sin and of the species of sin to
which he exposes himself--and this even though the sin does not
actually follow. For to love what is so closely related to the sin is
to love the sin itself. (b) He who rashly exposes himself to the remote
danger of grave sin or to the proximate danger of venial sin is
venially guilty. For, while such action is unreasonable, it does not
imply affection for grave sin.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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