That aroused him, and he woke up from his lethargy long enough to start the Neapolitan troops forward and to settle the civil administration a little. A good many Frenchmen still remained in the Neapolitan army, and in order to retain them, and have some company in his matricidal course, he assured them that the treaty was a feint, and that he was working heart and soul for his beloved country. But he so entangled himself with lies that he presently found it difficult to move in any direction without finding the net of them about his feet. The Neapolitans disliked and distrusted the French, because they saw in them a drag upon Joachim’s wheel. The French despised the Neapolitans, and presently departed, seeing clearly whither they were being led. Since the only officers of any value in the Neapolitan army were these Frenchmen, Murat was now compelled to rely upon the Germans—that is to say, the very men he had fought against in the preceding year. The French were not in sufficient numbers to offer any real resistance, and it was not long before Civita Vecchia, Sant’ Angelo, Florence, Leghorn, Ferrara, and Ancona were in Murat’s hands. Bentinck presently landed at Leghorn with 14,000 Anglo-Sicilians, and Eugène, the Viceroy, found himself with 50,000 men opposed to 45,000 Austrians, 20,000 Neapolitans, 8,000 Germans under Murat, and Bentinck’s Anglo-Sicilians. Of course Murat mistrusted his allies, and the allies returned the compliment with interest. He had no very high opinion of them as soldiers either, in which he was justified. Bellegarde carried his suspicion so far as to refuse to build a bridge or two over the Po, lest Murat might use them against him, and Murat became convinced that Bellegarde and Bentinck wanted to make him attack the Viceroy in order to injure his troops and his reputation—for what were 30,000 Neapolitans in the scale against 50,000 Frenchmen commanded by good officers and in the hands of such generals as Eugène had on his staff? He discovered, too, that Bentinck, who had landed as his ally, was permitting his Sicilians to distribute pamphlet copies of an edict of Ferdinand’s, reminding the Neapolitans of his rights, and inciting them to rise against Joachim! Bentinck was not a very clever man, and here he showed himself to be a fool. He had already given the Duke of Wellington a good deal of trouble by ruining the Duke’s market for specie in Spain, offering a higher price for it than the Duke could afford to give, and by various other ill-judged and ill-timed schemes. Now, having Joachim on his side—the one man among them all who could lead an army—he deliberately attempted to ruin his influence in the moment of action, by turning his own men against him, and by siding with Bellegarde in every question of military policy, wherein neither of them was really worthy to be allowed to carry out his, Joachim’s, orders.