Mr. Justice Stephen then proceeded: “Now, let us see what the doctors say. Some say death was caused by arsenic, and others that it was not by arsenic--that he died of gastro-enteritis”; and he spoke of the medical evidence in a way which amounted to a direction to the jury that they were to treat it as _tainted with subtle partisanship_, and as evidence to which it was not necessary for them to attach _serious importance_. He, in fact, stated, and in so doing _misdirected_ the jury, that though it was essential to a verdict unfavorable to the prisoner that he died of arsenic, that question was one which they, the jury, could come to _their own opinion about, without taking into consideration the opinion of the medical experts, who had positively stated that arsenic was not the cause of death_. In other words, he directed the jury that, as the medical experts could not agree that the cause of death was arsenical poisoning, it was for them to decide that question from their own “_knowledge of human nature_.” On the second day of the summing-up the judge told the jury (and it is submitted that it contains _gross misdirections_): “You must consider the case as _a mere medical case_, in which you are to decide whether the man did or did not die of arsenic according to the medical evidence. You must not consider it as _a mere chemical case_, in which you decide whether the man died from arsenic which was discovered as the result of a chemical analysis. You must decide it as _a great, high, and important case_, involving in itself not only medical and chemical questions, but embodying in itself _a most highly important moral question_--and by that term, moral question, I do not mean a question of what is right and wrong in a moral point of view, but questions in which human nature enters and in which _you must rely on your knowledge of human nature_ in determining the resolution you arrive at.