Men, many of whom were ignorant of history and geography (and it seems that these famous experts who thus disarrange and rearrange the map of Europe at their will really know as little about it as their masters), have said: “The moment the Turks give trouble to the English, we will suppress Turkey; but the moment that Italy, in order to become a Mediterranean power, ought to have the Adriatic as her inland gulf, we deny Italy her Adriatic rights.” What is the result? The result is that this kind of treaty naturally falls to pieces before the others. But, since everything depends upon the making up of these treaties, since they are all connected with each other, so the failure of the Treaty of Sèvres may possibly involve the failure of all the others. Moreover, if the position becomes more involved, you will see the indestructible Russian Cossack, who changes his name but not his nature, coming forward again. Who armed the Turkey of Kemal Pasha? France and Russia. Who may possibly arm Germany to-morrow? Russia. Considering what we aim at in our foreign policy, it is very fortunate that besides our national army, of glorious tradition, there is the Fascista army. Our Ministers for foreign affairs ought to know how to play this card too, with the warning: “Be careful; Italy no longer follows a policy of renunciation and cowardice, cost what it may!” So it has come about that while in other countries men are beginning to realise the force represented by Italian Fascismo, in the field of foreign policy our Ministers still remain in a yielding attitude. We are asked what is our programme. I have already answered this question, which was meant to be insidious, at a little meeting held at Levanto in the presence of thirty or forty Fascisti, and I did not think that a little homely speech would have such a vast echo. _Our Programme. The Crisis of the Liberal State._ Our programme is simple: we wish to govern Italy. They ask us for programmes, but there are already too many. It is not programmes that are wanting for the salvation of Italy, but men and will-power. There is not an Italian who does not think that he possesses the one sure method by which the most acute problems of our national life may be solved. But I think you are all convinced that our political class is deficient. The crisis of the Liberal State has proved it. We have made a splendid war from the point of view of collective and individual acts of heroism. From having been soldiers, the Italians, in 1918, became warriors. I beg you to note the essential difference. But our political class carried on the war as if it had been work of ordinary administration. These men whom we all know, and whose very features are familiar to every one of us, now appear men of the past, ruined, tired and beaten.