Agreed that treaties, when once perfected and ratified, must be loyally carried out, I go on to establish another fundamental principle, which is the rejection of all the famous “reconstructive” ideology. We admit that there is a kind of economic union or interdependence among European countries. We admit that this economic life must be reconstructed, but we refuse to think that the methods hitherto adopted will succeed in doing so. Commercial treaties concluded between two Powers—the basis of the closest economic relations between nations—are of more value in the reconstruction of the European economic world than all the complicated and confused general plenary conferences, whose lamentable history everybody knows. As far as Italy is concerned, we intend to follow a policy which will be dignified and at the same time compatible with our national interests. (Loud applause.) We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of a policy of foolish altruism, or of complete surrender to the desires of others. _Do ut des._ For Italy to-day has a new importance which must be reckoned with adequately, and this fact is beginning to be recognised beyond her boundaries. We have not the bad taste to exaggerate our powers, but neither do we wish to belittle them with excessive and useless modesty. My formula is simple: “Nothing for nothing.” Those who wish to have concrete proofs of friendship from us must give us the same. Fascista Italy, just as she does not intend to repudiate treaties for many reasons, political, moral and economic, does not intend, either, to abandon the Allies—Rome is in line with London and Paris; but Italy must assert herself and impose upon the Allies that strict and courageous examination of conscience which has not been faced by them from the time of the Armistice up to the present day. Does an Entente still exist in the full sense of the word? What is the position of the Entente with regard to Germany and Russia? with regard to an alliance between these two countries? What is the position of Italy in the Entente, of the Italy who, not solely by reason of the weakness of her governors, lost strong positions in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, who did not obtain any colonies or raw materials, who is literally crushed under the load of debts incurred in order to obtain victory, and whose most sacred rights, even, were held in question? In the conversations I intend to have with the Prime Ministers of England and France, I mean to face clearly and in its entirety the question of the Entente and Italy’s position within it. As a result of this, alternatives will arise; either the Entente, finding a way of settling her inward perplexities and contradictions, will become a really solid homogeneous body, with evenly distributed forces, with equal rights and equal duties, or her hour will have struck, and Italy, regaining her freedom of action, will turn loyally with a new policy to the work of safeguarding her interests.