I was in Havana in the latter part of March—upon a private errand, although the Cuban papers persisted in imputing sinister designs to me. Naturally, the Germans were not inclined to tell all their secrets, but my Mexican acquaintances, all of whom were well informed regarding Cuban affairs, gave me considerable information. Among other Mexicans I met General Joaquin Maas, the former general of the Federal forces under Huerta. The general has since made peace with Carranza and was at this time acting as the latter’s go-between in negotiations with Germany. When I last saw Maas, it was after the battle of El Paredo. He was about to blow out his brains, but one of his lieutenants elegantly informed him that he was a fool and dissuaded him from suicide. Maas received me with the courtesy due a former opponent and was not averse to telling me much about the situation. I also had ample occasion to speak with Spaniards, whose sympathies were decidedly pro-German. Little by little I was enabled to acquire a rather complete idea—not of the issues underlying the Cuban revolution—but who had brought matters to a head. The answer may be found in one word—Germany. German agents—notably one Dr. Hawe ben Hawas, who recently took a mysterious botanizing expedition throughout that part of Cuba, which later became the scene of revolutionary activities, and who has thrice been arrested as a German spy—saw in the political unrest of the country another opportunity to create a diversion in favor of Germany. Cuba at peace was a valuable economic ally of the United States. Cuba in rebellion was a source of annoyance to this country, since it meant intervention, the political value of which was unfavorable to the United States, and a serious loss in sugar, which is one of the most important ingredients in the manufacture of several high explosives. Hence the burning of millions of tons of sugar cane. Hence the rebel seizure of Santiago de Cuba. Hence the large number of negroes who joined the rebel army, and whose labor is indispensable in the production of sugar. The ironic part of it all is that Germany had nothing to gain by a change of government in Cuba. Any Cuban government must have a sympathetic attitude toward the United States. What Germany wanted was a disruption of the orderly life of the country—and she wanted it to continue for as long a time as possible. At the present writing the Cuban rebellion is ended. General Gomez and his army have been captured, President Menocal is firmly seated in power again, and the rebels hold only a few unimportant points. But much damage has been done in the lessening of the sugar supply—and the rebellion has also served its purpose as an illustration of Germany’s ability to make trouble.