The question of supplies was becoming very serious; we had in our stores only about 500,000 kg. of supplies. That would last us about six weeks. But it had been found that these figures were deceptive. The piled-up sacks had to a great extent lost weight and the grain had been eaten by insects. The new harvest could not be expected until March at the earliest. If the operations were to be continued it was necessary from this point of view alone to move south. I was still reckoning with the possibility that Captain Tafel’s force might arrive in the neighbourhood of Massassi and Chiwata, in which case I should hand over to him the supplies at Chiwata, while I crossed the Makonda hills in the direction of Lindi with part of the Chiwata force and attacked the enemy’s main line of communication on the Lukuledi river. In whichever way the situation might develop, the Chiwata district was, on account of its fertility, of the greatest importance to us. Chiwata was, however, not protected and was further threatened by the fact that enemy operations were taking place in the north against Mnacho, and enemy mounted forces had been seen on the Lukuledi-Lindi road in the neighbourhood of Ndanda. Also enemy aircraft were paying our camp at Chiwata increasing attention. These were my reasons for withdrawing from Lukuledi at the end of October with the main part of my forces. It could not be foreseen whether another opportunity would offer of making another attack from Chiwata on one of the enemy columns that would be passing before long. For the next few weeks the enemy’s pressure was again directed against Wahle. Quite fresh troops were appearing there, among them the Cape Corps of South African half-castes. This corps had been stationed along the Central railway and had been brought up to reinforce General Beves’ troops, apparently via Dar-es-Salaam and Lindi. Fortunately General Beves had not waited for this reinforcement before his defeat at Mahiwa. General Wahle was retiring step by step up the Lukuledi river. I was, unfortunately, not able to send him any support, but even had to draw on his forces to have troops in hand ready for a favourable opportunity for an attack and to protect the supplies. In the almost daily bush-fighting of General Wahle’s force heavy losses were apparently inflicted on the enemy, and he was held severely in check. There was, however, no defeat and no considerable capture of booty, and meanwhile our supplies were getting lower and lower. On 6th November, I rode from Chiwata to Nangoo, near Ndanda, where, close behind Wahle’s force, I found a suitable point of attack for the Chiwata troops. On 7th November I rode back from Nangoo to Chiwata, making a détour south across the Makonde hills. On the same day enemy troops were again reported at Lukuledi, and on 9th November an affair of patrols took place at Chigugu, just west of Chiwata.