I knew that in the area along the Rovuma the English and Portuguese had systematically destroyed our supplies. Our small dumps, requisitioning stations and supply columns had been attacked and the supplies destroyed. The natives had been influenced against us. The north and south banks of the middle Rovuma were only thinly populated; at Tunduru, further up the Rovuma, strong forces of both sides had been engaged and the supplies there were probably exhausted. I could get no reliable information about the Mafia plateau south of the lower Rovuma. Even if, as many reported, this had been a richly-cultivated district before the war it was very doubtful whether now, after strong Portuguese forces had been billeted there for years, there would be any food left. The most probable place for finding supplies seemed to me at that time to be the district where Major Stuemer’s operations had taken place: the corner between the Rovuma and the Ludjenda rivers and further south in the region of Nangware and Mwembe. Even this was doubtful, for here, too, war had interfered with the agriculture of the natives. Meanwhile, of the various improbabilities this last seemed to me the least improbable, and I decided to march at once up the Rovuma. A determining factor in the choice of this direction was my wish to equip my force for a prolonged period of action by a large capture of ammunition and other war material. Previous observation and the reports of the natives led me to believe that somewhere near the Rovuma the enemy still possessed large stores. On 20th November we reached Nevale, where we were joined by the patrols which had secured our southern flank, and the reorganization of the force was finally carried through. At Nevale the last men unfit for marching were left behind, and on 21st November we marched south to the Rovuma with 300 Europeans, 1,700 Askari, and 3,000 bearers and other natives. Every man was loaded to his full capacity. In general, as the supplies were consumed, the bearers no longer required were left behind, so as to keep the number of consumers as low as possible. In many cases we had to refuse the urgent requests of our good old bearers to remain with us, a large number offering to carry on without pay, some even without either pay or rations; these were ready to provide their own rations from what we threw away and Pori fruit. The quartermaster at that time, Naval Lieutenant Besch, reorganized the supplies and transport service very efficiently. He deserves the chief credit for the force’s ability to carry on.