It was difficult to decide on the most favourable moment for our change of direction north-east; we should have to rely to some extent on the fortune of war. Even if I made the movement too soon and encountered one of the enemy columns there was always a chance of defeating it when cut off from the rest. The first thing, however, was to get safely across the Likungo river again. The available information as to the fords was very unreliable. In order not to use the same fords as before I marched with my main body on the evening of 4th July to a crossing further to the south. Lieutenant Ott, however, ascertained by personal reconnaissance that no ford existed at the place of which we had been informed. On the other hand, it was apparent from native information as well as from tracks discovered that on the same day an English patrol had halted in this neighbourhood. The position might become awkward. In order to lose no time in investigation I marched along the west bank of the Likungo to our previous ford. Unfortunately I had withdrawn the covering force that had hitherto been left there and I did not know whether it was free. I was therefore very relieved when on 5th July the crossing was effected without further interference. Koehl’s detachment was still at Namacurra and followed as rearguard. When we were again marching as a single column through the bush, the great length of the column was unwieldy and, in the event of an encounter with the enemy, would be a source of danger. We therefore tried to shorten the column and to march in two, and later in several parallel columns through the bush. The disadvantage of this arrangement was that instead of one head of a column having to cut a way through the bush this had now to be done by several. But the advantages of the shorter length outweighed this disadvantage.