It turned out later that the enemy’s troops marching parallel with us had crossed the Namirrue at the same time a little further upstream. In view of the constantly changing situation, due to the continuous movement of the forces and the impenetrable screen of the bush which made it impossible to see far in any direction, and also owing to the large number of his marching columns, it was quite impossible for the enemy, in spite of the unremitting labours of his wireless service, to obtain a clear picture of the situation as a whole and to keep his subordinate leaders informed in time of all the changes of the situation. In this case a column had become detached and had run upon us with only a part of its strength: only one battalion had crossed the river. In an exposed and very dangerous position this battalion had been badly handled by our main force. A company detailed for the further pursuit of the retreating enemy returned the following day without having achieved anything more; here, again, after such a favourable action the subordinate leaders and the troops themselves could only with difficulty be persuaded to throw themselves in to the last ounce to wring every possible advantage from their success. Lieutenant Schroetter, who then for several days carried on the pursuit in a manner in keeping with the situation, was unable to effect more than a few patrol skirmishes. The enemy had, in the meantime, gained too great a start. No information was obtained except as to the very hurried flight of the enemy. [Illustration: Fig. xix. The Action at Namirruë, July 23, 1918.] I, with the main part of my forces, stood my ground. The full exploitation of the success lay less in the pursuit of the beaten enemy than in the chances offered by the situation of the enemy we were surrounding on the hill, now that the help intended was for the moment unavailable.