In pouring rain we had to pitch our camp in the bush. On the next day the camp we had observed had been struck. The Boma of Regone was held in considerable strength. An attack on this place over the bare hills offered no prospect of success, and we confined ourselves to skirmishes with patrols and single detachments. As I had seen from his papers, the enemy had given orders that we should be allowed to strike at Regone unhindered and then attacked in the flank or rear by the strong reserves which lay outside. It was therefore necessary to exercise particular caution, and the impetuosity with which Lieutenant Boell’s company, in spite of all these considerations, advanced on the Boma might have had serious consequences. Several enemy camps and columns outside the entrenchments were surprised by our fire and some supplies captured. The captured papers informed us of the approach of strong enemy columns from the south and south-east towards Regone. But there were also troops to the north; whether these were in the neighbourhood of Lioma-Malacotera or at Malema could not be ascertained. It was, however, certain that they were at hand and it was probable that they were approaching Regone, and that from the north. As a _coup de main_ against Regone offered no prospect of success, and a prolonged enterprise, in view of the intervention to be expected from outside, could not be relied on, I determined to resume the march. On account of the obstacles formed by the rivers and swamps south of Lake Nyassa, the line of march I had formerly decided on to the west appeared ill-advised, especially as the enemy could, with the help of steamers and railways, easily concentrate and maintain a force there. A further march north seemed to me more practicable, passing the lake on the east; it seemed probable that our return to German East Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who would take our objective to be the natural capital of this district, Tabora. Under this impression he might be expected, in order to save his main force the difficult overland march to Tabora, to withdraw to the Portuguese coast, take ship from there to Dar-es-Salaam, and proceed by rail to Tabora. These calculations were to a large extent realized. It was natural that, having reached the north end of Lake Nyassa, I should continue my march, not to Tabora but in another direction, probably west. In any case, the first thing was to reach the north end of the lake. This could not be done in less than a month and meanwhile the situation might alter considerably.