IN our rear, Major Fischer, who with five companies had been employed between Kilima Njaro and Meru, had evaded the enemy’s superior forces by moving on New Moshi, and had been ordered up to Kahe. Captain Rothert, who had been acting under his orders with his company and the Arusha Detachment (strength about one company), had been energetically pursued by the enemy, and had made his way by Arusha towards Kondoa-Irangi. We could only expect to get into touch with him by the wire which had been put up from Dodome, by Kondoa-Irangi to Umbulu, and that only after a considerable time. By abandoning New Moshi we, of necessity, left the road Taveta-New Moshi-Arusha open to the enemy. The latter was thus also enabled to penetrate into the interior of the Colony with his troops from Taveta by Arusha and Kondoa-Irangi, and to act there against our communication at an extremely dangerous point. From our troops concentrated in the neighbourhood of Kahe and New Steglitz he had not much to fear during this operation. Although we had brought up all our companies from Tanga, leaving there only the troops absolutely indispensable for security, all we could do with our four thousand rifles was to let the enemy run up against us on suitable ground, and, possibly, to take advantage of any mistakes he might make by skilful and rapid action; but the odds against us being seven to one we could attempt no more. From an attack on an enemy superior not only in numbers, but also in equipment, and holding fortified positions into the bargain, I could not possibly hope for success. I could not, therefore, accede to the requests of my company commanders that we should attack, but this expression of a bold soldierly spirit gave me strength and hope in the serious situation in which we were placed. Minor enterprises, undertaken against the enemy’s camps by patrols and small detachments, produced no results of consequence; but they may have helped to make the enemy’s main force take some notice of us instead of simply marching on past us. He certainly did push on to the west from Himo, and heavy clouds of dust were seen moving to New Moshi and further on to the west. But a large part of the enemy coming from Himo turned in our direction. For the commander such situations are extraordinarily trying; he is not master of the situation, and must, of necessity, renounce the initiative. Only the most careful reconnaissance may perhaps reveal some weakness of the opponent, and in order to utilize this weakness and regain the initiative, not a moment must be lost. Fortunately, however, the enemy did expose weak points of which we were able to take at least partial advantage.