Our withdrawal, which the enemy probably took to be involuntary, apparently led him to believe that he would be able to rout us next day by a vigorous attack. The attacks made by powerful hostile forces on the front of Stemmermann’s Detachment at Kahe on the 21st March were unsuccessful; the enemy, composed mainly of South African infantry, was beaten off with heavy loss. Our four-inch _Königsberg_ gun, directed from elevated sites affording a good view, fired on the approaching enemy, apparently with good effect. It may be assumed that part of their severe casualties, which the English stated to have amounted on this day to several hundred among the South African Europeans alone, were caused by this gun. The enemy realized that he could not advance over the field of fire extending for five hundred yards in front of our trenches with any hope of success, and endeavoured to envelop our right flank. But having previously reconnoitred and determined tracks, we were also well prepared to execute a counter-attack, and in the afternoon Schulz’s Detachment effectively struck at the enemy’s flank. The last part of Schulz’s advance had, indeed, been very arduous owing to the thick bush. The Askari could only work through it step by step, when they suddenly heard the enemy’s machine guns at work only a few paces in front of them. Unfortunately, however, this counter-attack was not completed owing to the events which occurred in the meantime on our left. The activity displayed by patrols during the preceding days, and the clouds of dust, had shown that strong detachments of the enemy’s horse, coming from near New Moshi and keeping to westward of the Kahe-New Moshi railway, were trying to work round our front, which faced north, and of which the left wing was at Kahe Station. The continuation of this movement would have brought them on to the railway in our rear, and cut us from our communications while we were engaged with a superior opponent with our front to the north. I had, therefore, posted a strong reserve of eight companies in readiness at Kahe Station. But as I thought it necessary during the action to remain at Kahe village, near Stemmermann’s Detachment, I was unable to exercise rapid and direct control over the reserves at Kahe. The dense vegetation prevented any distant observation. The control of the reserve at Kahe had to be left to the initiative of the commander on the spot and his subordinates. The latter had observed that hostile troops had advanced through the bush and occupied a hill south-west of Kahe Railway Station. One company had, on its own initiative, attacked this force, but the advance had broken down under shrapnel fire. Thereupon our four-inch gun opened fire on these light guns and drove them off.