[Footnote 1: This is my own explanation of what happened. Bagration says that he reached Smolensk at 10 a.m.; but Raievski declares that the leading brigade of the 8th Corps did not arrive until past 6 p.m., and speaks of Bagration coming later. Either the march of the 8th Corps was much delayed, or it moved with amazing slowness under the circumstances. Seeing what Bagration had written to Raievski, it is difficult to suppose that he would not make all speed to his rescue. It is only possible to reconcile the conflicting statements as to the hour of Bagration’s arrival at Smolensk by such an assumption as is made in the text. For the rest it must be admitted that Bagration’s despatches are often unreliable, and he naturally endeavoured to present himself in the best light. When there is a conflict of testimony between him and Raievski, I prefer to believe the latter.] [Footnote 2: Only thus is it possible to reconcile the statements of the Russian historians that the action began at 10 a.m. with that of Eugen of Württemberg, that he did not withdraw from Gedeonovo until about that hour. Ney seems to have followed him to his second defensive position before he was recalled, which brings us to 11 a.m. at least; and then time must be allowed for the march of nearly 6 miles to Tuchkov’s front.] CHAPTER VI THE OPERATIONS IN VOLHYNIA AND ON THE DÜNA It has been seen that when King Jerome resigned his command, the 5th and 8th Corps went to reinforce Davout, Latour-Maubourg to observe Bobruisk, while the 7th Corps returned to Slonim. Reynier was instructed to take the place of Schwarzenberg in guarding the frontier of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, while the latter marched on Minsk. Reynier himself was convinced that his corps was far too weak for the prescribed duty, while he had better information than his master of Tormazov’s real strength. Nevertheless he endeavoured to carry out Napoleon’s orders. On the 19th he ordered Klengel’s infantry brigade and a regiment of cavalry to take the place of an Austrian detachment at Kobrin. On the same day Schwarzenberg informed Napoleon that Tormazov had some 30,000 men at Lutsk. The Emperor, however, was sceptical. On the 22nd he ordered Reynier to enter Volhynia, saying that Tormazov’s “army” was merely a collection of reserve battalions. On the same day he told Davout that Tormazov had only 8000 men of 3rd battalions. The movements which he had ordered continued, and by the 24th the Austrians were about Slonim, on the way to Minsk, while the 7th Corps, moving in the opposite direction, was approaching Kobrin, some 30 miles east of Brest-Litovsk. Napoleon’s information was hopelessly inaccurate. So far he could not be accountable for the unforeseen situation which was now to disclose itself. But his refusal to believe Schwarzenberg and Reynier is distinctly blameworthy, and can only be attributed to the fatal optimism which had now become fixed in him.