It may be regarded as certain that Napoleon had originally intended to conclude the campaign of 1812 at Smolensk. When he first began to contemplate a change of plan cannot be determined, but it is possible that it was at a comparatively early period of the campaign. The elusive strategy of his opponents cannot but have kept before his eyes the probability either of being forced to extend the area of his operations, or of taking up winter-quarters with his self-imposed task unfinished. Jomini points out that the fact that he did not then disclose his purpose may merely indicate that he wished to encourage his weary troops by the prospect of a speedy end of their toils. On the other hand, it is highly probable that his decision was not formed until after the battle of Smolensk. The absolutely negative results of that engagement forced him to consider the necessity of pushing on to strike a crushing blow. Had he succeeded in disorganising the main Russian army by a heavy defeat he would probably have stayed his advance, and devoted the rest of the campaigning season to solidly organising his communications, and crushing Tormazov and Wittgenstein. So much for the time at which Napoleon decided to continue his advance. His reasons fall under three headings--military, political and personal. Napoleon played many parts on the stage of history, but he was in the first instance and before everything a soldier. Military reasons may therefore justly take priority of place. Since crossing the frontier in June he had kept steadily before him the crushing of the principal forces of Russia in a great battle. This purpose he had failed to effect. The Russian armies were yet unbroken, and had suffered, relatively to their numbers, less heavily than their opponents. They were retiring upon their resources, and, slow and difficult as was the organisation of reinforcements, the Russian national spirit was thoroughly roused, and the vanguard of the new levies was beginning to reach the fighting line. But for the moment this fighting line was much weaker than the forces immediately under Napoleon’s command, and would probably succumb to them in a pitched battle. Were it allowed to manoeuvre rearwards, and rally and assimilate the new levies which were being collected and drilled, the chances of Napoleon’s success would be greatly diminished. His lines of communication were already troubled by Cossacks, and time would mean the increase of these vexatious irregulars both in numbers and efficiency, thus compelling larger detachments and weakening the striking force upon which everything really depended. It was practically certain that the elusive Russians would never abandon “White-Walled Moscow” without a battle, and it was necessary to go forward to seek it while the striking force was yet strong enough to deal a decisive blow. It would also appear that the halt on the Düna and Dnieper had permitted the accumulation of