Under cover of darkness the Russian army quietly withdrew, and on the 8th took up a position in front of Mozhaïsk. The retreat was effectually covered by the Cossacks, who displayed great audacity, and in the night of the 7th-8th repeatedly disturbed the French bivouacs. The French cavalry, shattered and exhausted, could do little or nothing, and the Russians remained all through the 8th at Mozhaïsk, employing the time in reorganising, and in evacuating towards Moscow as many as possible of their wounded. Nevertheless many were left to inevitable death on the field, and thousands more abandoned at Mozhaïsk to the mercy of the French, who, themselves in a sorely distressed condition, simply cast them out to die of misery in the fields. Regarding the major tactics of the battle of Borodino there is little to say. Napoleon had deliberately chosen to make a frontal attack upon the Russian army in place of turning it; and in the practical absence of his personal supervision the battle almost fought itself. The idea of taking advantage of the extension of the Russian right by overwhelming the left was an excellent one. It was foiled by the determination of Bagration’s resistance, which permitted Baggohufwudt’s corps to be moved across to his support. On the part of the Russians the occupation in force of the position north of the new road proved a blunder, which the remarkable solidity of the Russian resistance enabled the generals to repair in time. As regards what is often considered Napoleon’s fatal error in not throwing in the Guard it is very doubtful whether it was an error at all. It must be remembered that Ney’s and Davout’s troops were almost, if not quite, fought out, that the Russians were still solid and undemoralised, and holding a position quite as strong as that from which they had been evicted; and that Kutuzov still had some almost untouched reserves. The Guard would have had no easy victory, and Napoleon was probably right when he refused to expose it to severe and perhaps fatal losses. He knew that the Russians were neither routed nor in disorder; and if they stood to fight again nearer Moscow he might yet have sore need of his Guard. He was 1200 miles from the frontier of his dominions, and in case of disaster all must depend upon it. Of the minor tactics little need be said. On both sides they were crude and wasteful. There was a deficiency of infantry on the French side, and the cavalry was freely employed to supplement it, with the result that it was half destroyed. The infantry formations were dense and clumsy, it was a case of heavy mass pushing against heavy mass, with cavalry mingled in the melée, and all under the fire of a thousand or more pieces of artillery. It is no wonder that the losses were unprecedented on both sides.