Murat, with his advanced guard, strengthened by Claparède’s division, and supported by Poniatowski, was following the Russians. At the Pakhra he lost touch, and not until the 23rd was the true direction of Kutuzov’s march ascertained and followed up, Raievski retiring on the main army. Napoleon apparently did not believe that Kutuzov’s whole force was to the south of Moscow--at all events he adopted a dangerous half-measure, which might have resulted in disaster. Murat was to press the Russians’ right, while a column under Bessières marched from Moscow against their front. Bessières’ force comprised the infantry division of Friederichs (_vice_ Desaix), now increased by the 33rd Léger, a brigade of light cavalry, Colbert’s Lancers, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps detached from Murat. Its strength cannot have exceeded 11,000 men, while Murat certainly had not more than 25,000. Barclay and Bennigsen urged an attack, and it is clear that Murat must have been destroyed, or forced to retreat in haste. The cautious Kutuzov, however, inferred that Bessières was merely Napoleon’s advance-guard--as a fact the Emperor did on the 28th issue orders for a general advance on the Pakhra. As Kutuzov envisaged the situation, he would have the whole _Grande Armée_, enormously superior in regular troops, upon his own weakened forces. The superior condition of his cavalry and artillery could scarcely be relied upon to give him more than a doubtful success. On the other hand, every day would bring the winter nearer and ensure the steady increase of the Russian numbers. He accordingly decided to retire towards Kaluga. The 4th Corps was detailed to strengthen Raievski, and Miloradovich took command of the rear-guard. On the 27th there was a brisk encounter of cavalry on the Pakhra. On the 29th another engagement took place at Czerikovo. Poniatowski’s infantry were checked; General Ferrier was wounded and taken, and the advantage was, on the whole, with Miloradovich, who retired very slowly, contesting every mile of country.