Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
History
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812
Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Military leadership; Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia
For almost a month after Napoleon’s return to Moscow on September 20th,
the main French army lay almost inactive about the city. The Emperor’s
anxieties on the score of supplies had been to some extent relieved
by the quantities of food and ammunition captured. He says himself in
a letter to Lariboissière, the Chief of Artillery, that he has taken
300,000 pounds of powder, and an equal amount of sulphur and saltpetre,
besides an immense number of cannon-balls and 2,000,000 cartridges.
It can scarcely be imagined that, however much the habit of lying had
become ingrained in him, he would wilfully mislead the man whom, most
of all, it was necessary to furnish with correct information.
A number of cannon were captured, but all practically useless. The
Kremlin, in fact, was and is a museum of ancient weapons, mostly
preserved as trophies of Russia’s victories over her enemies. Among
them now are hundreds of the guns of the Napoleonic _Grande Armée_
of 1812. The cannon had no carriages, but about twenty of them were
mounted by the French artillerymen on the walls of the ancient citadel.
The captures of ammunition were of extreme value. Napoleon exultantly
declared that he could fight four battles of the magnitude of Borodino.
Forage, however, was seriously deficient. The cavalry and artillery
of the Guard, which received supplies in advance of the other corps,
remained in fair condition, but that of the rest of the army rapidly
deteriorated. The horses died in great numbers. At the beginning
of October De Chambray estimates that already 4000 troopers were
dismounted. The misery in the advance-guard was great; breadstuffs
could hardly be obtained, and the men lived chiefly upon horse-flesh.
In Moscow matters were by no means satisfactory. The troops had indeed
shelter and food; but these advantages were dearly bought at the
price of a fatal relaxation in discipline. The privileged Guards were
bad offenders, and Napoleon himself had at last to complain of their
misconduct. The 1st Corps was little better. The 3rd and 4th Corps
were mostly outside the city. They lived chiefly from hand to mouth as
before, and though a considerable amount of flour had been warehoused
at Moscow Napoleon would not permit it to be issued, even when Berthier
reported Pino’s division as being completely destitute. No issue was
made of clothing material until October 17th, nor were any preparations
made for rough-shoeing the horses. In the general relaxation of
discipline little was done by the men themselves. In the face of
proven facts such as these the statements as to Napoleon’s unerring
and all-pervading foresight and activity, made even by respectable
witnesses such as Rapp and Fain, make somewhat foolish reading.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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