Meanwhile at Tarutino the reorganisation of the Russian army was being energetically proceeded with. The man immediately responsible for it, who justly received the major part of the credit, was Konovnitzin, who has already been repeatedly met with in his country’s battles. Konovnitzin was a strong adherent and admirer of Barclay, and seems to have possessed his chief’s virtues of modesty and devotion to duty. Borodino and the subsequent actions had grievously shattered all the regiments, and some had been practically destroyed. These were either dissolved or sent back into the interior to reform; the combined Grenadier battalions were broken up and distributed; and the militia and new recruits then drafted in. The experienced Russian generals did not make the mistake committed by the leaders of the Spanish uprising in 1808-1809 and swamp the battalions with raw levies. Only the picked men who had received some training were sparingly introduced among the war-seasoned soldiers. Even so Kutuzov was very distrustful of his infantry. Horsemen cannot be trained so easily as foot-soldiers, and the Russian cavalry could not be greatly increased in strength. Such reinforcements as it received must have consisted of small drafts and rejoining convalescents. It included the same regiments as had fought at Borodino, but all were in a greatly reduced condition. The men, however, were in high heart and the horses in excellent condition. The artillery was also in admirable order. Alexander had made an appeal to the loyalty of the Don Cossacks, which was seconded by the great personal influence of Platov. By the middle of October there were present in the Moscow theatre of war some fifty regiments of irregular horsemen. Reorganisation and steady reinforcement had their effect. The numerical strength of the Russian army at Tarutino began to rise at once, and its efficiency steadily increased. The number of battalions had fallen to 147 by October 18th, but they had all been brought up to an average strength of over 500 bayonets, except those of the Guard, which, having no depôts at hand, were rather weaker. By October 23 the strength of the Russian Grand Army, including its detachments, had risen to 105,000 regulars, including 12,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 Cossacks, with an artillery train of some 650 guns excellently appointed and horsed. Kutuzov made certain changes in the organisation. The entire regular cavalry was massed in four unequal “Corps,” one of which consisted of Cuirassiers. Lieutenant-General Prince Golitzin I received the command of the Cuirassier Corps, and the 1st and 3rd were given to Major-Generals Baron Müller Zakomelski and Vassilchikov respectively. Baron Korff continued to command the 2nd, which was increased to 8 regiments of Dragoons, and 1 or 2 of light cavalry. The various army corps still retained their old leaders, except the 3rd, which was now commanded by Strogonov.