Murat’s line stretched from the confluence of the Chernishnia with the Nara to the hamlet of Teterinka, some 5 miles to the westward, and about 4 south of Spas-Kuplia. Vinkovo, which lay south of the Chernishnia, was occupied by Claparède’s Poles, supported by the 3rd Cavalry Corps, under General St. Germain, and a division of the 1st. To the left rear of Vinkovo lay Dufour’s division, with the rest of Nansouty’s cavalry corps on its left. Still farther to the south of the Chernishnia stood Poniatowski’s corps, with Sebastiani’s cavalry on the extreme left. Latour-Maubourg was watching the Nara on the right rear. Murat’s whole strength hardly exceeded 25,000 men; he was encumbered rather than supported by about 180 miserably horsed guns; and his 9000 or 10,000 cavalry were in a wretched state. [Illustration: PLAN OF BATTLE OF VINKOVO, OCTOBER 18TH, 1812 General position at moment when Murat’s retreat began] The Russian plan contemplated a demonstration by part of the bulk of the army against Murat’s extended front, while Bennigsen, with a force composed of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps, Müller Zakomelski’s cavalry, and 10 regiments of Cossacks under Orlov-Denisov, turned his left. Miloradovich was to move towards Vinkovo with Korff’s and Vassilchikov’s cavalry, while behind him the rest of the army debouched from Tarutino. Orlov-Denisov and Müller Zakomelski fell, about 7 a.m. on the 18th, upon Sebastiani’s bivouacs, while Baggohufwudt attacked the 5th Corps in front. His advance had been revealed by the growing light and some premature shots, and the Poles were able to form and oppose a vigorous resistance. One of the first shots from their artillery killed Baggohufwudt, and his fall rather dashed some of his young troops, especially when the remains of the French Carabiniers, led by Murat himself, gallantly charged the 48th Russian Chasseurs. The Russian cavalry on the right, however, swept away Sebastiani, capturing most of his baggage and artillery, and pushed on towards Spas-Kuplia, which they occupied, thus cutting Murat’s line of retreat. The position would have been critical had the Russian horsemen been supported by infantry. The whole of the French line gave back in haste, but the Russian 2nd Corps, imposed upon by Murat’s bold charge, and shaken by the fall of its leader, followed very cautiously. Ostermann-Tolstoï failed to advance with the necessary speed; and Bennigsen thought himself obliged to hold back the 3rd Corps until the arrival of the 4th. The result was that the entire French army, in great disorder, indeed, and suffering considerably from the Russian artillery fire, succeeded in effecting its retreat. Orlov-Denisov and Müller Zakomelski were obliged to abandon Spas-Kuplia as infantry came up; and the line of retreat was clear. Meanwhile Kutuzov was executing his part of the programme very slowly or not at all. Only Miloradovich’s cavalry, supported by five