In direct pursuit of Napoleon, Kutuzov sent forward the various flying columns and Cossack detachments, and a special force under Yermólov, consisting of the Chasseurs of the Guard, six battalions of Dokhturov’s corps, 2 regiments of Cossacks and 12 guns. The united force of these detachments may be estimated at 20,000 men and 40 guns. The vanguard of Miloradovich, which was to follow in support, totalled also about 20,000 men. A regiment of Chasseurs had been left to garrison Smolensk. With the rest of the army Kutuzov marched slowly to Kopys, which he reached on the 24th, Miloradovich being about two marches farther on, and Yermólov and Platov were in advance of the vanguard. Kutuzov left the guns of 12 batteries at Kopys, using their men and horses to complete weakened units, and detailed to escort them the remains of the light cavalry of the Guard. On the 26th he left Kopys with a force reduced now to about 40,000 men and 200 guns. Napoleon was already at the Berezina, and for all practical purposes the Russian Grand Army was off the board at the decisive moment. What was worse, though his information was naturally out of date, Kutuzov still endeavoured to control the operations of Chichagov and Wittgenstein. Chichagov on the Berezina was in a state of great uncertainty. His army was not now more than 33,000 strong, and his 10,000 cavalry were almost useless on the wooded and marshy banks of the river. He was without information of the main armies later than the evacuation of Moscow. On the evening of the 21st the Comte de Rochechouart, one of the Admiral’s French _émigré_ staff-officers, found among Bronikowski’s half-burnt papers a despatch from Victor, stating that Napoleon would probably reach Borisov on the 23rd. The news must have been something of a shock to Chichagov, since he naturally expected to be attacked by greatly superior numbers. His conduct at this juncture has been sharply criticised, yet one does not well see what else he could have done. He moved forward the advance-guard, now commanded by Major-General Pahlen II, towards Lochnitza, on the Orsha road, to give warning of any hostile advance, established his head-quarters in Borisov, and kept the bulk of his force on the right bank of the river. His errors appear to have been that he allowed too much of his baggage trains to cross, and permitted a large detachment of his cavalry to disperse to forage; the latter step may, however, have been necessary. The point is that Chichagov was ignorant of the deplorable condition of the Moscow army, and rather expecting to be himself attacked. Wittgenstein, on his side, possessed very scanty information about the general state of affairs, and his staff estimated Napoleon’s strength as at least 60,000. The result was that his movements were extremely slow and circumspect.