At Vilna Napoleon might expect his last powerful reinforcement--Loison’s division of the 11th Corps, which reached the Lithuanian capital in the last week of November with two cavalry regiments of D’Estrée’s Neapolitan division in Danzig. There were besides in Vilna 6000 or 7000 troops of all kinds--_régiments de marche_ and Polish and Lithuanian levies. Maret, with the best intentions but disastrous results, ordered Loison’s division forward to Ochmiana to take position and cover the retreat of the relics of the army into Vilna. It was composed of young French and German recruits, and three or four days of the cruel weather nearly destroyed it. How many men actually died and how many disbanded cannot be ascertained; it is only certain that on December 7th there remained in the ranks less than 3000 men! At Molodechno on the 3rd, just as the cold was becoming deadly, Napoleon, who already contemplated leaving the army, issued practically his last direct orders. The remains of the Polish divisions were sent off south-west towards Warsaw, which they eventually reached in safety with such guns as they had preserved. Here Napoleon received the first posts which had reached him for several days, the others having presumably been intercepted by the Cossacks. Here also he composed and sent off the 29th Bulletin. It is so well known that little reference to it is necessary. It is, however, to be observed that it is as grossly mendacious as any of the Napoleonic series; and the Emperor’s total lack of appreciation of the often heroic conduct of his troops throws a very disagreeable light upon his character. Certainly no one, reading its paragraphs, would conclude that the campaign had been an annihilating catastrophe. Every post brought shoals of letters to Maret, enquiring about the food supplies at Vilna, furiously attacking the Poles for not supporting him, and his own agents for not having urged them to do so! One most remarkable question is as to whether Vilna and Kovno are fortified. Surely Napoleon should have given orders on this point. The fact seems to be that at first he had been over-confident of success, and later had overlooked the necessity of protecting his bases--witness the case of Minsk. On the 29th of November he had ordered the minister to clear all the diplomatic body away from Vilna, lest they should be witnesses of the awful state of the army. On December 3rd, Victor--much against his will--relieved Ney of rear-guard duty. He was weary of the war, and desired chiefly to save the relics of his corps. The result was a quarrel between the two marshals. The survivors of the 9th Corps succeeded in holding off Chaplitz in an engagement on the 4th, but next day Victor reported that it was completely used up, and could not receive the lightest attack. He hurried on to Smorgoni with the few hundred frost-bitten men who remained to him.