As early as August 6th Napoleon told Eugène that an early renewal of hostilities was to be anticipated, and that he should probably advance on Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper. On the same day he was asking Davout for information as to which bank of the river was in his opinion the better for the advance. Davout’s reply was that upon the whole he thought the left bank the more suitable, and apparently this decided the Emperor. The merits and demerits of the plan will be discussed later. Here it is only necessary to observe that it was preconceived, and not due to the influence of Russian operations. The two Russian armies were concentrated at Smolensk by August 4th. The city had practically no fortifications of value. Its massive brick walls were capable of resisting the attack of field guns, but there were several ill-closed breaches; and the only guns in the place were antique pieces without carriages, kept mainly as relics. Smolensk was garrisoned by a column of 17 depôt battalions, 8 squadrons and 4 batteries of artillery--about 6000 or 7000 men--which had been brought from Kaluga by General Winzingerode. The infantry was drafted into the two armies, ten battalions going to the 1st, seven to the 2nd, which had dwindled during its forced marches, and needed more strengthening in proportion. The artillery was also divided, but the squadrons were sent back to Kaluga to serve as a nucleus for fresh formations. Winzingerode was sent with the Kazan Dragoons from Uvarov’s division and 3 regiments of Cossacks to observe the French left wing towards Surazh and Poriechie. There then remained a held army of 121,000 men, of whom over 18,000 were regular cavalry, with some 650 pieces of artillery.