It is somewhat remarkable that there is no indication during this period of any attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of the Russians. Napoleon knew that they had not pushed their advance on Vitebsk, but he was apparently so confident that his move would meet all emergencies that he does not seem to have troubled himself about the 120,000 enemies who were somewhere to his left. Barclay, as has been seen, was facing towards Poriechie. About this time he received a direct order from Alexander to take the offensive. Bagration moved to Prikaz Vidra on the 9th; and Barclay reported that the two armies could concentrate in a day if necessary, that in their position they covered Smolensk and the country between the Düna and Dnieper, and could easily be supplied from the magazines which had been prepared beforehand at Toropetz and other places. Bagration, however, was not satisfied. He was in a mood which would probably have induced him to quarrel with anything that Barclay did. He told Arakcheiev that the War-Minister’s head-quarters were so choked with Germans that a Russian could not live there, and that constant marching and counter-marching would drive him mad. To Yermólov he wrote that he had neither hay, straw, bread nor a position, and that Barclay must either do something or else supersede him (Bagration). He expected that Napoleon would amuse them by demonstrations about Rudnia, and move on Smolensk by their left. It is not clear whether this anticipation of the French Emperor’s intentions was the result of careful reflection, or simply due to the natural tendency of every commander to imagine himself the especial object of the enemy’s attentions. The result was that Barclay, in despair, gave Bagration a free hand. He empowered him to withdraw upon Smolensk if he judged it necessary, and in general to take his own measures for the protection of the Russian left flank. The unfortunate War-Minister was beset by open and secret foes, and this, added to the responsibility which weighed upon him, probably explains this extraordinary step, which practically amounted to an abdication of the supreme command. On the 12th, accordingly, Bagration withdrew towards Smolensk. On the same day, however, Barclay received fresh information that the French were in force near Poriechie. It was absolutely baseless, but he could scarcely discredit it, more especially as he was obsessed by the idea of an attack from that quarter. He wrote to Bagration that he expected an attack on the 15th, and took up a position between the Kasplia lake and the village of Volokovaia, about 22 miles north-west of Smolensk. He called up Bagration to Katan and Nadva, about 8 miles farther north-west, in order to guard his own left. On the 13th the Second Army was retiring on Smolensk, and the 7th Corps had actually reached the place when Barclay’s order of recall arrived.