Raievski reached Smolensk at dawn on the 15th. In the town was General Bennigsen, who was accompanying the army apparently in the hope of succeeding to the chief command. To him the anxious commander of the 7th Corps went for advice, but Bennigsen was not the man to assist juniors in difficulties, much less to allow himself to become associated with what might be a great disaster. He put Raievski off with a few meaningless words, merely counselling him to save his artillery. Raievski, as he says, felt that when the fate of Russia hung in the balance it was no time to think of a few guns. He took up a position about 2 miles in advance of the town, and awaited Neverovski, who arrived at 2 p.m. From him Raievski learned that probably the whole French army was advancing upon Smolensk, and hurried off a despatch to Barclay. At 5 p.m. he heard artillery fire at his outposts, and, hurrying to the front, saw the masses of Murat’s cavalry coming up from Korythnia. Raievski did not falter. As he saw it his duty was plain. He and his men must die, if necessary, in defence of the city, for if it fell Napoleon could take Barclay and Bagration in rear, cutting their line of communication with Moscow and the south. He was supported by Paskievich, to whom, according to his biographer, the main credit of the resolution was due. This assertion may be taken for what it is worth, though there is no reason to doubt that Paskievich cordially supported his chief’s resolution. Smolensk, in 1812, lay chiefly upon the southern bank of the river. It had formerly been a great frontier fortress, but since the advent of artillery its importance had dwindled, owing to the fact that it was more or less commanded by low heights. Its nucleus consisted of the ancient fortified city, whose massive brick walls formed an irregular pentagon of nearly four miles in circumference. These walls were generally about 30 feet high and from 15 to 20 in thickness. At the top were galleries open to the sky, too narrow to admit of guns being placed in position. At intervals were 32 towers, in which staircases gave access to the walls. It was only on the platforms of these towers that artillery could be placed, and they were in general less solidly constructed than the walls. Inside the walls were backed by ancient earthen ramparts. At the south-west angle was a small regular fort of earth, in so neglected a condition that its ramparts could easily be scaled by infantry. This so-called “Royal Citadel,” dating from the days of the Polish occupation, constituted in reality perhaps the weakest point in the line of defence. Close to the southern or Malakova Gate a breach, made during the siege by Sigismund III of Poland in 1611, was covered by an earthen redan. The walls were encircled by a ditch and covered way, also in a neglected condition. Along the east side a considerable gully gave further protection, and at the west side was another but shallower depression.