No precaution was taken to provide for the losses of Burgoyne's army, nor to supply the necessary drafts upon it to garrison the posts in his rear, guarding his communications with Canada. When he gained possession of Ticonderoga, he called upon Sir Guy Carleton to furnish the necessary force to hold the place; but Carleton did not feel justified, under his precise orders, to send troops beyond his jurisdiction. Consequently, Burgoyne "drained the life-blood of his force" in the field to provide for the defence of this and other works left behind. Burgoyne's _logistics_, or means of supplying and moving his army, were very defective. Not till June 7, 1777, a month after his arrival in Canada, did he make provision for the transportation of either stores or artillery, and then his arrangements were so entirely inadequate that they seemed based upon the assumption that his adversary was his inferior in all military qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest", while for his own personal baggage he used no less than "_thirty carts_." Most of his provisions had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington. After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward, which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th. Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany. General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne could have been reassembled at 'Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the