It seems impossible that one devoid of fear, brave even to rashness, who even courted danger at the risk of death, and one too who was filled with ambition and love of military glory, could possibly have allowed his command to go into action without leading its movements and sharing its perils. His subsequent heroism amid the carnage of battle at Bemis's Heights would seem a sufficient refutation of the charge that he who was always in the thickest of the fight was only a looker-on while the conflict of September 19th was raging around Freeman's Farm. Gates, in his official report of the battle of Freeman's Farm, makes no mention of Arnold being engaged; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson, in his _Memoirs_, written long after Arnold's good name had been blasted by his treason, says: "Not a single general officer was on the field of battle on the 19th of September, until evening, when General Learned was ordered out." Under ordinary circumstances, the testimony of the commander-in-chief and his adjutant-general would be considered conclusive; but it must be borne in mind that both of these officers were inimical to Arnold, that neither was personally engaged in the battle, and that the wooded character of the ground precluded either from following any one's movements through the conflict. On the other side, we have the contemporary testimony of officers present on the battlefield, newspaper accounts of the time, and Arnold's own division order of the day after the battle, in which he speaks of the zeal and spirit of the company officers engaged, in a manner which none but a close observer could notice. Besides, we have the direct evidence of two of Arnold's staff officers—Colonels Livingston and Varick—that their chief was the hero of the battle of Freeman's Farm; the former warmly lauding "his conduct during the late action", and declaring that "to him alone is due the honor of our late victory." Even the enemy's chief, Burgoyne, said in the British House of Commons: "Mr. Gates had determined to receive the attack in his lines. Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, foreseeing the danger of being turned, advanced without consultation with his general, and gave instead of receiving battle." Another much-disputed point is whether to Schuyler or Gates is chiefly due the triumph of our arms in the Burgoyne campaign. Bancroft, in his _History of the United States_ (vol. ix. ch. 21, orig. ed.), states that Schuyler lacked military talents, failed to harry the advance of Burgoyne, wanted personal courage, and had no influence with the people. All these charges have been triumphantly refuted by his grandson and by his biographer.[731]