It had not been the intention of Howe, when he ordered Cornwallis over the Hudson, to do more than take possession of and hold East Jersey, and Cornwallis's orders did not permit him to go beyond Brunswick. But the slight opposition which Washington was able to offer to the British advance excited in Howe the hopes of capturing Philadelphia, and he joined Cornwallis in person at Brunswick. After a short halt, he pushed on towards Stirling at Princeton, and before Washington could reach that general Stirling was in full retreat, to avoid being intercepted. A retrograde movement was ordered, and by the 8th the American army was on the west bank of the Delaware. The advance of Cornwallis's column reached the river before the rear-guard of the Americans had landed on the Pennsylvania side; but as Washington had secured all the boats for a considerable distance above and below Trenton, his position was comparatively a safe one. Here for a time he rested his men, and urged upon Congress the necessity of raising additional troops, and the importance of preparing for the defence of Philadelphia, as the military stores were in that city. In his retreat through the Jerseys, Washington was greatly embarrassed by the conduct of General Charles Lee. The instructions he had given Lee on the 17th of November to join him may have been discretionary, but the language and frequency of his orders left no doubt of the expectations of the commander-in-chief. But Lee chose to read the orders in the light of his wishes. On the east of the Hudson he had an independent command, which he purposed to retain as long as he could. Schemes and suggestions that should have had no weight were allowed to delay his passage over the river until December 2d, and then his advance was slow and hesitating. The prospect of receiving reinforcements from the Northern army, which would make his command equal to that of Washington, strengthened his wish to act independently. He proposed, as soon as the troops from the north should join him, to attack the rear of the enemy. While this plan may not have been devoid of military judgment, it is doubtful if it would have had more than a temporary effect on Howe's movements, while it would have deprived Washington of the reinforcements he so greatly needed. Notwithstanding Washington's explicit directions to avoid the enemy in joining him, Lee hung so close to the enemy's flank as to leave a doubt of his real intentions, and on the morning of the 13th, just after having put on record that he believed Washington to be "damnably deficient", he was surprised and taken prisoner by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, at White's tavern, near Baskingridge, three miles from his camp. [Illustration: CHARLES LEE From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, i. p. 478.]