“Colonel Peacocke’s reinforcements were to join him sometime in the morning, and being anxious that there should be no delay in starting, he telegraphed back to Hamilton and St. Catharines directing that the reinforcements should bring with them a supply of cooked provisions, so that no delay should be occasioned by waiting to get breakfast for the men after they arrived. At about 4.30 a. m. the expected reinforcements came up and after being unloaded, Colonel Peacocke mentioned to the officers commanding that he should march at six o’clock, it being then nearly five. _They at once objected on account of their men not having had any breakfast, and very little to eat the whole of the previous day_, and they were unable to bring anything with them, _as they were unprovided with haversacks in which to carry it_.” Severe animadversions have been directed against this commander for his having delayed on that morning to give his own regiment and other regulars breakfast, while the Hamilton, and Toronto Volunteers had marched to battle while fasting. It was the volunteers, newly arrived at Chippewa, not the regulars, for whom breakfast and delay were requisite. Whatever the degree of misfortune may have been, arising from that circumstance, it was directly traceable to the misjudged economy of the Provincial executive in not having provided equipments for volunteers suitable for the field and to the negligence of commanding officers, who preferred scrupulous attention to the inferior trifles of parade show, well enough in their way, but not vital to the soldier’s efficiency in fight, existence under privation. Two more passages are here materially important. “Being unwilling to set out upon a very severe march, to finish probably with a severe battle, and through a country where it would be difficult to get food, Col. Peacocke decided it would be better to wait an hour to enable the men to get breakfast, and immediately telegraphed to Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march an hour. This message, did not reach him until he was engaged with the enemy. _Had he started at the proper time he would have received the message before he left_, for even to have reached Stevensville at 9.30 it was not necessary for him to leave Port Colborne until six. He was at the battle ground, three miles from Stevensville at 7.30; and if not interrupted would have reached Stevensville at 8.30, about an hour earlier than Capt. Akers mentioned, and two hours before Colonel Peacocke’s time of junction. This mistake of one hour led to his not receiving the message to delay, and therefore caused him to be really three hours too soon.