Having now got fairly into Tongkoo Bay with the fleet, and feeling something of the interest and excitement which were awakened in the breasts of all who were brought together in such a place and at such a time, we will next proceed to recount a few of the remarkable events of the year 1840, reserving the description of the other parts of the river for those portions of the narrative with which they are connected. Towards the end of July, 1840, the British force assembled in China had become considerable: comprising no less than three line-of-battle ships, with a Rear-Admiral and a Commodore; thirteen other ships of war, of different kinds, and a large troop-ship; together with four armed steamers, belonging to the East India Company. To these must be added twenty-seven transports, having on board the 18th, 26th, and 49th regiments, a body of Bengal volunteers, and a corps of Madras sappers and miners. The marines and seamen were of course prepared to co-operate on shore. This was undoubtedly a formidable force, especially when we reflect that little more than a year had elapsed since there was _no armed force whatever_ in the Chinese waters, and the flag of England had ceased to wave even upon the Factories. The measures adopted by the Governor-general of India, when once the crisis had arrived, were sufficiently energetic and decisive. The consequences of the rupture were now easily foreseen; and the interest which the state of our relations with China had begun to awaken, both in England and in India, was daily becoming more general. On the first arrival of the large force mentioned below,[15] it did not appear to alarm Commissioner Lin, and his obsequious satellite, Governor Tang, nearly so much as might have been expected. On the contrary, Lin continued to organize means of defence, to enlist soldiers, and to arm his forts. It was, moreover, at this moment that he hit upon his notable expedient of offering immense rewards for the destruction, in any manner whatever, of British ships, either men-of-war or merchant vessels, and also for the capture or slaughter of British officers. But the reward for taking them alive was to be greater than for killing them. There was also a reward for taking soldiers or _merchants_, but only one-fifth of the sum if they were killed. A reward was also to be given for the capture of _coloured people_, soldiers, or servants, although its amount was not mentioned. All this followed after the declaration of blockade by Sir Gordon Bremer, and after a public complaint had been made by Captain Elliot against Lin and Tang, for various treacherous acts, such as attacking our vessels at night (merchant vessels), poisoning the water, and preventing supplies of food from being brought to the factories, &c. It was now very evident, that although no formal declaration of war had been made on our part, it had become impossible to avoid warlike operations on an extended scale, and at no distant time.