Natural history of intellect, and other papersEmerson, Ralph Waldo
Philosophy
Natural history of intellect, and other papers
Emerson, Ralph Waldo
American essays -- 19th century; Boston (Mass.); Intellect; Memory; Michelangelo Buonarroti, 1475-1564; Milton, John, 1608-1674
There is a pernicious ambiguity in the use of the term _subjective_.
We say, in accordance with the general view I have stated, that the
single soul feels its right to be no longer confounded with numbers,
but itself to sit in judgment on history and literature, and to
summon all facts and parties before its tribunal. And in this sense
the age is subjective.
But, in all ages, and now more, the narrow-minded have no interest
in anything but in its relation to their personality. What
will help them to be delivered from some burden, eased in some
circumstance, flattered or pardoned or enriched; what will help to
marry or to divorce them, to prolong or to sweeten life, is sure
of their interest; and nothing else. Every form under the whole
heaven they behold in this most partial light or darkness of
intense selfishness, until we hate their being. And this habit of
intellectual selfishness has acquired in our day the fine name of
subjectiveness.
Nor is the distinction between these two habits to be found in the
circumstance of using the first person singular, or reciting facts
and feelings of personal history. A man may say I, and never refer
to himself as an individual; and a man may recite passages of his
life with no feeling of egotism. Nor need a man have a vicious
subjectiveness because he deals in abstract propositions.
But the criterion which discriminates these two habits in the poet’s
mind is the tendency of his composition; namely, whether it leads
us to nature, or to the person of the writer. The great always
introduce us to facts; small men introduce us always to themselves.
The great man, even whilst he relates a private fact personal to him,
is really leading us away from him to an universal experience. His
own affection is in nature, in _what is_, and, of course, all his
communication leads outward to it, starting from whatsoever point.
The great never with their own consent become a load on the minds
they instruct. The more they draw us to them, the farther from them
or more independent of them we are, because they have brought us to
the knowledge of somewhat deeper than both them and us. The great
never hinder us; for their activity is coincident with the sun and
moon, with the course of the rivers and of the winds, with the stream
of laborers in the street and with all the activity and well-being of
the race. The great lead us to nature, and in our age to metaphysical
nature, to the invisible awful facts, to moral abstractions, which
are not less nature than is a river or a coal-mine,—nay, they are
far more nature,—but its essence and soul.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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