The whole impression of the British fleet was to be made to overpower from two to three ships ahead of the enemy’s Commander-in-chief (supposed to be in the centre) to the rear of his fleet. Admitting twenty sail of the enemy’s line to be untouched, it would be some time before they could perform a manœuvre, so as to bring their force compact, to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succor their companions; and this they could not do without mixing with the ships engaged. If it happened that the two fleets were of less force than here contemplated, a proportionate number only of the enemy’s fleet were to be cut off, and the British were to be one-fourth superior to the enemy so cut off. Lord Nelson, making due allowance for what chance might effect, looked with confidence to a victory, before the van of the enemy could succor his rear; and then he expected that the British ships would most of them be ready to receive the enemy’s other twenty sail, or to pursue them, should they endeavor to make off. If the van of the enemy tacked, the captured ships were to run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wore, the British were to place themselves between the enemy and the captured, as well as their own disabled ships; and should the enemy close, his Lordship made no doubt of the result. The second in command was to direct the movements of his line and to keep the ships as compact as circumstances permitted. Captains were to look to their own line as their rallying point; but, in case signals could neither be seen nor perfectly understood, _no captain could do wrong who placed his ship close alongside that of an enemy_. So far with regard to the attack from to leeward. Next followed the plan of attack from to windward. Supposing the enemy formed in line-of-battle to receive the British fleet, the three divisions of the latter were to be brought nearly within gun-shot of the enemy’s centre, when the signal would most likely be made for the lee line to bear up together, under all sail, in order to reach the enemy’s line as quickly as possible, and then to cut through; beginning at the twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear. Some ships might not get through at their exact place, but they would always be at hand, to assist their friends; and if any British ships were thrown round the rear of the enemy, they would, it was considered, effectually complete the business of twelve of the enemy’s ships. Should the enemy wear together, or bear up, and sail large, still the twelve ships of the enemy’s rear were to be the object of attack of the British lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander-in-chief, an interference not contemplated in the plan, as the entire management of the lee line, after the Commander-in-chief had signalized his intentions, was to be left to the judgment of the Admiral commanding that line.