Naval battles of the world : $b Great and decisive contests on the sea ... with an account of the Japan-China war and the recent battle of the Yalu; the growth, power, and management of our new Navy.Shippen, Edward
History
Naval battles of the world : $b Great and decisive contests on the sea ... with an account of the Japan-China war and the recent battle of the Yalu; the growth, power, and management of our new Navy.
Shippen, Edward
Naval battles; Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895; United States. Navy
In the afternoon the weather cleared, and the wind shifted to
north-northwest; whereupon Admiral Villeneuve ordered his fleet to form
in five columns, in accordance with a plan previously communicated to
his Admirals and Captains.
The Allied fleet then divided itself into two parts. The first part
was of twenty-one sail, and was denominated the line-of-battle, and
this was again subdivided into three squadrons, of seven ships each;
of which the centre was commanded by Villeneuve himself; the van by
Vice-Admiral Alava; and the rear by Rear-Admiral Dumanoir.
The second part of the Allied fleet, the reserve, was divided into two
squadrons, of six ships each, the first under Admiral Gravina, and the
second under Rear-Admiral Magon.
Villeneuve’s instructions to these officers were as follows: in case
of being to windward, the line to bear down together, and each ship
to engage her opponent in the English line; to engage closely, and to
board, if possible.
If, on the contrary, the English fleet was to windward, the allied
fleet was to await attack in close order of battle.
The French Admiral said, “the enemy will not confine himself to forming
a line-of-battle parallel to ours, and engage us with his cannon, when
success often attends the most skillful, and always the most fortunate;
he will endeavor to turn our rear, to pass through our line, and will
endeavor to surround such of our ships as he succeeds in cutting off,
and reduce them with numbers of his own.”
Villeneuve adds “there is nothing to alarm us in the sight of the
English fleet; their 74-gun ships have not five hundred men on board;
their seamen are harassed by a two years’ cruise; they are not more
brave than we; and have infinitely less motives to fight well, and have
less love of country. They are skillful at manœuvring. In a month we
shall be as much so as they are. In fine, everything unites to inspire
us with hopes of the most glorious success, and of a new era for the
Imperial marine.”
The most remarkable feature of the French Admiral’s plan was, that it
persisted in ordering the movements of his fleet to be conducted in
close line-of-battle, even while he admits that his enemy will adopt
a different mode of attack, that of cutting off the rear of the line,
and making it an easy conquest. Such, however, was the ancient rule of
sea-tactics, and France had not yet had a Rodney to break through them.
Shortly after the combined Fleet had formed in five columns, one of
their advanced frigates made the signal for eighteen sail of British
ships in sight. On this the fleet, still on the port tack, cleared for
action, and at about five P. M. tacked, and stood for the mouth of the
Straits of Gibraltar. They had continued so long on the other tack that
Lord Nelson thought it was Villeneuve’s intention to proceed to the
westward.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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