49. Isaiah liii. 50. Doc. & Cov., Sec. xxxviii: 15. 51. II. Nephi ii. It is a pleasure to note that this process of reasoning, remarkable as it is, and startling as it is in its conclusion, is in harmony with modern thought. Mr. Lester F. Ward, whose works I have already quoted in this chapter, by a closely analogous order of reasoning, reaches the same conclusion. This the passage: "The pleasure of 'doing good' is among the most delicious of which the human faculties are capable, and becomes the permanent stimulus to thousands of worthy lives. It is usually looked upon as the highest of all motives, and by some as the ultimate goal toward which all action should aspire. It should first be observed that the very act of doing good presupposes evil, i. e., pain. Doing good is necessarily either increasing pleasure or diminishing pain. Now, if all devoted themselves to doing good, it is maintained that the sufferings of the world would be chiefly abolished. Admitting that there are some evils that no human efforts could remove, and supposing that by united altruism all removable evils were done away, there would be nothing left for altruists to do. By their own acts they would have deprived themselves of a calling. They must be miserable since the only enjoyment they deemed worthy of experiencing could be no longer possible, and this suffering from ennui would be among those which lie beyond human power to alleviate. An altruistic act would then alone consist in inflicting pain on one's self for the sole purpose of affording others an opportunity to derive pleasure from the act of relieving it. I do not put the matter in this light for the purpose of discouraging altruism, but simply to show how short sighted most ethical reasoning is." 52. II. Nephi ii. 53. "Origin and Development of Religious Belief," Vol. II., pp. 22, 23. 54. Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, p. 197. 55. Ibid. pp. 197-8. 56. See Rev. xii: 7. Jude 6.