But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England: I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise....--(British "White Paper" No. 87.) Stirring Up Trouble. On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow: His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.--(British "White Paper" No. 98.) Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports: He [Poincare] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.--(British "White Paper" No. 99.) Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments? On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words: