2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way that the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the moment of occupying it to resume the offensive all together. 3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive before this point should be reached must be utilized by the whole of our forces and the British forces. THE FRENCH COUNTER-ATTACK. The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant and often fruitful. On Aug. 20 we successfully attacked St. Quentin to disengage the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve division engaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which was debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British front was freed. On Aug. 27 we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the enemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfée and of Jaulnay. Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of the General in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemont line. Further to the right another army took part in the same movement and carried out successful attacks on Aug. 25 on the Othain and in the region of Spincourt. On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being disturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armies were, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive. On Aug. 26 a new army composed of two army corps, five reserve divisions, and a Moorish brigade was constituted. This army was to assemble in the region of Amiens between Aug. 27 and Sept. 1 and take the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with that of the British Army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme. CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT. The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain by the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity had two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. On the one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and, on the other hand, the British Army, forced back further by the enemy, uncovered on Aug. 31 our left flank. Our line, thus modified, contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the offensive. To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of Sept. 2. A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as Château Thierry. The First Army, (General von Kluck,) comprising four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne. The Second Army, (General von Bülow,) with three active army corps and two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region. The Third Army, (General von Hausen,) with two active army corps and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Château Porcien and Attigny.