I do not assume that Mr. Asquith's notions about the right way to overthrow militarism are not sound notions. I assume that they are sound. I think that his common sense is massive. Though it is evident that he lets his Ministerial colleagues do practically what they choose in their own spheres, and though there are militarists in the Cabinet, I do not, like The Morning Post, consider that the Prime Minister exists in a stupor of negligence. On the contrary, I assume that at the end of the war, as at the beginning, Mr. Asquith will control the foolish, and that common sense will prevail in the Cabinet when a treaty is the subject of converse. Still further, I will assume that, contrary to nearly all precedent, the collective sagacity of the Ministry has not been impaired, and its self-conceit perilously tickled, by the long exercise of absolute power in face of a Parliament of poltroons. And, lastly, I will abandon my old argument that the discussion of peace terms might shorten the war, without any risk of prolonging it. And still I very strongly hold that peace terms ought to be discussed. It appears to me that there is a desire--I will not say a conspiracy--on the part of the Government to bring this war to an end in the same manner as it will be brought to an end in Germany--that is to say, autocratically, without either the knowledge or the consent of the nation. The projected scheme, I imagine, is to sit tight and quiet, and in due course inform the nation of a fact accomplished. It can be done, and I think it will be done, unless the House of Commons administers to itself a tonic and acquires courage. Already colonial statesmen have been politely but firmly informed that they are not wanted in England this year! The specious excuse for keeping the nation in the dark is that we are allied to Russia, where the people are never under any circumstances consulted, and to France, where for the duration of the war the Government is as absolute in spirit and in conduct, as that of Russia; and that we must not pain those allied Governments by any exhibition of democracy in being. Secrecy and a complete autocratic control of the people are the watchwords of the allied Governments, and therefore they must be the watchwords of our Government. This is very convenient for British autocrats, but the argument is not convincing. The surrender of ideals ought not to be so one-sided. We do not dream of suggesting to the Russian and the French Governments how they ought to conduct themselves toward their peoples; and similarly we should not allow them to influence the relations between our Government and ourselves.