but with respect to the future it fills me with anxiety when I think how easy it is to stir up the fire of international jealousy, and how hard it is to quench it." It was all the harder in view of the fact that the King, from the very beginning of his reign, adhered tenaciously to the political idea of using the old French revanche notion as the cardinal point of English policy. In April, 1903, the King began a series of political trips to Portugal, Spain, France, and Austria, while Berlin, very strangely, was not visited by him. Each one of these visits resulted in political agreements, into which Vienna alone declined to enter, and which, after a return visit on the part of Loubet, at that time President of the French Republic, and after a surprising visit in Paris on the part of certain members of the English Parliament, led to the significant English-French agreement of April 8, 1904, a treaty which culminated in the balancing of Morocco against Egypt and made it possible for the English Government, as soon as it chose, to regulate the Morocco question in such a way that it would necessarily bring about a conflict between France and isolated Germany. The ally of King Edward was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, who, on the basis of the agreements made with England, had likewise concluded treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed, insured the pénétration pacifique, i.e., the conquest, unhindered by Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how Delcassé was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand, attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany. The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty, who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after Delcassé had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an English fleet before Swinemünde, on which occasion it was officially asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at a time when the intrigues of Delcassé were culminating and when a war between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For even after Delcassé's overthrow England did not give up the game as lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William at Bjorkö, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly,