"Our attitude was determined exclusively by the ostensible interests of France, which were directly opposed to the interests of British commerce and of British enterprise.... From this it follows that alliances, nay, even political agreements, with Continental powers, which may coerce us to take steps that are, at a given moment, harmful to our national interests, should be avoided." Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber--when the Imperial Chancellor vigorously opposed him--with skillful legerdemain. In the upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same time, only one conclusion could be drawn--that official England was determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English Naval Attaché in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure, but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments and by circumstances. In view of all this we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that the mission which brought Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912, had any other purpose than that of satisfying the voices in England which were calling with ever-increasing vigor for an understanding with Germany. The proposals which he submitted to us, after a discussion with Sir Edward Grey, were formulated by the English Cabinet as follows: "Inasmuch as both powers naturally wish to maintain relations of peace and friendship with each other, England declares that it will neither make an unprovoked attack upon Germany, nor support any other power in making such an attack. To attack Germany is neither the direct nor the indirect object of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will England make itself a party to anything that has such an object." This carefully excogitated statement embraced in its Machiavellian wording neither those "oral conversations" at Reval nor the "innocent discussions" engaged in by the English and French General Staffs--discussions which were always revived on occasion of every political crisis. It was only natural, therefore, that we, since these relations between the General Staffs of the powers belonging to the Entente were no secret to us, demanded greater security and a declaration of neutrality on the part of England before consenting to enter into any general understanding.