In contrast with the victorious confidence of our veteran defense troops--a confidence that at times excited the amazement of their own leaders--the enemy continued to contemplate the German undertaking with inveterate skepticism. British and French prisoners captured during the Winter months indeed held out to us the prospect of achieving an initial success similar to that which their own offensive had achieved. But nowhere in the world did any one reckon upon more than the customary initial success for our enterprise. The German High Command decided from the very outset not to fight a "battle of matériel," but to build up success upon a more ideal foundation. Numerical inferiority was to be compensated by the warlike and moral qualities peculiar to the German Army organism. The same virtues that had proved the essential cause of the enemy's defeat were to form the surest guarantees of German victory. To the undeniable bravery of the English and French storming troops was to be opposed the utmost bravery of the German tribes; the good quality of the enemy leaders was to be met by better leading on the German side, and the thorough preparation of our adversaries by one still more thorough. As the Supreme Command could confidently reckon upon the two first as given quantities, there remained as the chief task the preparation of the attack. Unity of command and of forces, the latter non-German only in respect of a valuable group of Austrian batteries that had been placed in the line, facilitated the tremendous work. Frictions and impediments that are inherent even in the best organized coalition armies were spared us. It is impossible to picture what was accomplished in the map rooms of the German staffs by experienced specialists in defensive warfare, who worked in silence for months, at the highest nervous pressure, in the face of the confident expectation of the homeland and growing tension and impatience abroad. But it is certain that an altogether enormous expenditure of organizing energy was required in order to impart the method of attack; to ascertain and control the situation of the enemy; to supply the striking force with munitions and provisions; and finally to produce that masterpiece, the veiled march into line. Addresses by the Kaiser He Extols Militarism and Defines the Issues of the War The German Kaiser in two telegrams acknowledging congratulations on the thirtieth anniversary of his accession to the throne made announcements of historic interest regarding the issues of the war and the uses of militarism. On June 17 he telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling: