"On the 11th October, Your Lordship cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the Peninsula. On the 12th October I replied in terms showing that such a step was to me unthinkable. On the 16th October I received a cable recalling me to London for the reason, as I was informed by Your Lordship on my arrival, that His Majesty's Government desired a fresh unbiased opinion, from a responsible commander, upon the question of early evacuation." [Illustration: [_Photo by Captain Wilding, N.Z.F.A._ A GUN PIT OF THE 6TH HOWITZER BATTERY, N.Z.F.A.] The reasons for Sir Ian Hamilton's recall were not promulgated to the men on the Peninsula, but his departure was made known to the troops through a manly farewell order. The Colonial divisions were very sorry to see him go. His commanding figure, his charming personality, his warm and expressed admiration for the "ever-victorious Australians and New Zealanders" endeared him to the soldiers, who like himself, were high-spirited, brave, optimistic, and warm-hearted. "Our progress was constant, and if it was painfully slow--they know the truth." And knowing the truth we grieved to see him go. We knew that the age of miracles had passed, and that improvized machines could not stand the rough tests of war. General Munro Assumes Control. The new "responsible Commander" proved to be General Sir Charles Munro, K.C.B., a soldier of much experience in former wars, and a fine record of service on the Western Front. Until General Munro's arrival on the Peninsula at the end of October, General Birdwood acted as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. No movement was attempted during this period. There seemed nothing to do but strengthen the line and prepare for the bad weather everyone anticipated. General Munro arrived on the Peninsula at the end of October. His duty was: (a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula. (b) To express an opinion whether, on purely military grounds, the Peninsula should be evacuated, or whether another attempt should be made to carry it. (c) The number of troops that would be required-- (1) To carry the Peninsula. (2) To keep the Straits open. (3) To take Constantinople.