Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 2 (of 3)Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
History
Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 2 (of 3)
Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
Rome -- History
than this, Paullus was very loth to give battle, and it would also have
perhaps been best to wait quietly: the longer Hannibal kept himself
inactive, the more favourable matters became for the Romans; if once
the day was lost, all would be lost. Yet, on the other hand, much might
be said in behalf of the expediency of a battle. If the Romans could
not gain the victory with such superior numbers, they gave the allies,
who, as it was, were already troublesome, the opportunity of falling
off; and if, in their rear, the Samnites, or Capua proved faithless,
their situation would have been desperate. The Romans therefore passed
the river.
The first who has given a satisfactory and clear description of the
ground of the battle of Cannæ, was the traveller Swinburne. From his
account, the battle may easily be made out. The Aufidus near Cannæ
makes a bend within which the two armies took their position: the
Romans stood on the chord of the arc which is formed by the river;
Hannibal likewise passed over, and rested his two flanks on the curve
of the river, so that the numerical superiority of the Romans was of no
avail.
[Illustration:
_a._ Place where the Romans crossed.
_b._ Place where the Carthaginians crossed.
_c._ Line of battle of the Carthaginians.
_d._ Line of battle of the Romans.
]
The Romans therefore had the land behind them. Hannibal placed himself
in such a dangerous position, because anyhow he was lost, if he did
not win this battle. The Romans had 80,000 foot, and from 6 to 8,000
horse; among the latter, about 2,500 were Romans. The Carthaginians
had 40,000 foot, and also about 8,000 horse, most of which, however,
were Numidians; these were excellent for foraging, reconnoitering, and
harassing the enemy, but by no means fitted to stand the shock of a
battle, and of no use at all against heavy cavalry: if they were worth
anything, it was against light infantry. The Romans left ten thousand
men behind in the camp, and thus advanced against the enemy with only
70,000, from whom we are besides to deduct a large number for those who
at all times, and especially in a summer campaign, are either sick,
or remain behind from other causes. On their right wing, they had the
Roman cavalry; on the left, was that of the allies. Hannibal had no
elephants in this battle: he placed his best cavalry on his left wing,
over-against the right one of the Romans; on his own right, he had the
Numidians. Besides these, there were on the left wing the Libyans, and
on the right, the Celts and Spaniards, but part of the Libyans and
Celts were also in the centre. The Romans had not room enough for the
whole of their army; so that they were drawn up unusually deep, many
maniples being one behind the other, which in their system of warfare
was of no advantage. The battle was opened by the cavalry on the left
wing of the Carthaginians making an attack upon the Roman horse, who,
although they fought with great bravery, were soon routed, as the whole
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