Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 2 (of 3)Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
History
Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 2 (of 3)
Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
Rome -- History
Whether it be true that the winter-quarters in luxurious Capua made
the troops of Hannibal effeminate and dissolute, or whether this be a
mere rhetorical flourish, cannot now be decided any longer; but it is
evident that the Romans made a better use of the winter. When after
long and extraordinary exertions, men come into an easy life, they
often fall into a state of lassitude; they are then very apt to lose
the proper tone of mind, and the power of finding their way back to
their former condition, and it returns no more. This is a rock on which
many great characters have split. What, however, has not been taken
into account, is that Hannibal was not able to recruit his army from
Spaniards and Libyans. Every one of his battles cost him many men;
little skirmishes, and diseases in foreign climate, swept away a great
number; and he was only able to make up his losses from the Italians,
which we know with certainty as for the Bruttians. This circumstance is
quite enough to account for the demoralised state of his troops. The
Prussian army of 1762 was much inferior to that of 1757, and likewise
the French one of 1812, which fought in the Russian campaign, was
not so good as that of 1807. Another difficulty for him was that the
Romans, after the battle of Cannæ, had not let their courage droop:
they would not even receive Carthalo, the Carthaginian ambassador.
He found himself in the same plight as Napoleon was in Russia, after
the battle of Borodino, when the peace was not accepted. It is true
that part of southern Italy declared for him, and that he might have
reinforced himself from thence; but all the Latin colonies throughout
its whole extent remained faithful, and were not to be conquered. He
was master of the country, but with a number of hostile fortresses
in it. If he wanted to advance by Campania, he was obliged to subdue
the whole chain of fortified colonies, or to break through them, and
reduce the Latin and Hernican towns in the neighbourhood of the city.
These places were entirely in the interest of Rome, and indignant
at the faithlessness of Capua. It was especially Cales, Fregellæ,
Interamnium, Casinum, Beneventum, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Pæstum,
Æsernia, and others, which paralysed the peoples there; these could
not fairly gather their forces, because they had to fear the sallies
of the Romans. They therefore in most instances blockaded those towns,
and were no increase of strength to Hannibal. Thus his position was
far from being an easy one. He reckoned upon support from Carthage and
Spain; the former he got, as Livy states in a few lines (probably from
Cœlius Antipater), although in his view of the matter, it is always as
if the Carthaginians had deemed the whole undertaking of Hannibal to
be madness. According to Zonaras (from Dio Cassius), the reinforcement
was considerable; but it only came in the following year, or even
later: from Spain he received none at all. If dearth of money had
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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