Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 3 (of 3)Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
History
Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 3 (of 3)
Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
Rome -- History
of provisions, and Pompey’s cavalry was much stronger than his own. Here
again it was now the opinion of the cautious, that Cæsar’s army should
be allowed to wear itself out more and more by the distress in which it
was; and this was the opinion of Pompey himself. But his followers were
so childishly intoxicated with their hopes of victory, that they looked
upon this judicious advice as disgraceful. The senators, who knew
nothing whatever of war, deliberated with regard to the battle, how they
would after the victory divide the advantages among themselves; and
growing warm, they quarrelled together about who was to have the
pontificate and the other offices of Cæsar, and also the estates of his
partisans about to be proscribed. Cæsar was very anxious for a speedy
decision, being most confident of victory; for he despised Pompey, such
as he was then, and all his officers, They, on their side, deemed it a
shame to delay the battle; and they forced it on in such haste, that
Cæsar had hardly time to call back three legions which he had sent out
to forage.
Of this battle there are very different accounts, the best of which of
course is that of Cæsar himself; but we may believe Asinius Pollio that
the numbers which he gives are exaggerated. We may take it for granted,
that Cæsar had no more than twenty-two thousand infantry against forty
thousand infantry of Pompey, who had also an immense number of Greeks
and Asiatics as _auxilia_: these, however, were of no use whatever,
being somewhat ashamed to display their incapacity on a field where
Romans were arrayed against each other. In cavalry also, Pompey was far
superior to Cæsar in numbers; but the latter had Gallic and German
horse, whilst Pompey had young Roman volunteers, who perhaps faced an
enemy for the first time, and were like children against a host of
veterans. The story of the _faciem feri, miles!_ is not to be taken
literally. Cæsar had also trained his infantry to stand the shock of the
cavalry, and the onset of the Pompeians was repulsed by the cohorts; he
then made the Gallic and German cavalry charge the enemy, which decided
the battle: they broke Pompey’s left wing, so that his right, which
until then had fought with considerable success, was likewise forced to
retire. All fled into the camp, and there these foolish men believed
that the day was now over. But when they saw that the foe did not stop
at all to plunder, and that in close order they were attacking the camp,
the greatest confusion and rout ensued; Pompey started up like a madman,
and calling out, “Not even here will they leave us quiet!” ran away. All
dispersed, no one thinking of rallying so much as one cohort. The booty
was immense, as the camp of Pompey was found to be furnished with
Asiatic luxury; the tents were bowers, fitted up with carpets and costly
furniture. The Gauls and Germans gladly availed themselves of the
opportunity to revenge themselves on the Romans: but Cæsar had already
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