Consider for a moment what had happened in the industrial world. During the four years of war, Governments were the chief employers of men, the chief purchasers of raw materials, and the chief sources of revenue for an overwhelmingly large portion of the population. To retain the ideals of democracy Governments were given unlimited power—power which was utilized in organizing practically the entire life of the belligerent nations into a vast machine for turning out implements of war. Not only was this war-time industry mobilized under unified control, but the market for which its product was turned out could not be flooded. Indeed, it continually called for greater and greater production regardless of cost. The expansion of business, and the building up of a huge army of war workers, the scarcity of labor and raw materials, the shifting of markets, the meteoric rise of prices, the less rapid rise of wages, Government control of prices, raw materials and exports, the inflation of currency, the huge increase in national debts—these were some of the phenomena which characterized the period. They justify the assertion that a revolution in the economic and industrial life of the nations had occurred. Even in Canada, remote from the scene of actual strife, a generation’s changes were compressed into four short years. Then suddenly, on November the eleventh, the object for which the vast war machine had been built up was attained. The necessity for its existence vanished over-night, and the world found itself face to face with the task of scrapping the industrial machine which had so effectively served the requirements of war, and of rebuilding one which would serve just as effectively the entirely different requirements of peace. The new task was more difficult than the old, and had to be accomplished in a much shorter period—a few months, instead of four years. Again, the problems themselves were more delicate and intricate; largely problems of human psychology, not of mechanics, requiring for their solution not compulsion, but education, persuasion and co-operation. The world has learned that it is much easier to make war than to make peace. The early days of 1914 and 1915 were days of mobilization problems, and they were problems indeed. The provision of arms, equipment and food had to be undertaken on a scale unheard of before. It was necessary to provide transportation for vast bodies of troops and great quantities of stores, to say nothing of the construction of training camps, rifle ranges, and all the paraphernalia of war. The human element, fresh and easily responsive to patriotic appeal, presented few difficulties at that time.