Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciencesWhewell, William
Philosophy
Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciences
Whewell, William
Science -- Philosophy
2. We here mean by _Science_, that exact, general, speculative
knowledge, of which we have, throughout this work, been endeavouring
to exhibit the nature and rules. Between such Science and the
_practical Arts_ of life, the points of difference are sufficiently
manifest. The object of Science is _Knowledge_; the object of Art
are _Works_. The latter is satisfied with producing its material
results; to the former, the operations of matter, whether natural or
artificial, are interesting only so far as they can be embraced by
intelligible principles. The End of Art is the Beginning of Science;
for when it is seen _what_ is done, then comes the question _why_ it
is done. Art may have fixed general rules, stated in words; but she
has these merely as means to an end: to Science, the propositions
which she obtains are each, in itself, a sufficient end of the
effort by which it is acquired. When Art has brought forth her
product, her task is finished; Science is constantly led by one step
of her path to another: each proposition which she obtains impels
her to go onwards to other propositions more general, more profound,
more simple. Art puts elements together, without caring to know what
they are, or why they coalesce. Science analyses the compound, and
at every such step strives not only to perform, but to understand
the analysis. Art advances in proportion as she becomes able to
bring forth products more multiplied, more complex, more various;
but Science, straining her eyes to penetrate more and more deeply
into the nature of things, reckons her success in proportion as she
sees, in all the phenomena, however {132} multiplied; complex, and
varied, the results of one or two simple and general laws.
3. There are many acts which man, as well as animals, performs by
the guidance of nature, without seeing or seeking the reason why he
does so; as, the acts by which he balances himself in standing or
moving, and those by which he judges of the form and position of the
objects around him. These actions have their reason in the
principles of geometry and mechanics; but of such reasons he who
thus acts is unaware: he works blindly, under the impulse of an
unknown principle which we call _Instinct_. When man's speculative
nature seeks and finds the reasons why he should act thus or
thus;--why he should stretch out his arm to prevent his falling, or
assign a certain position to an object in consequence of the angles
under which it is seen;--he may perform the same actions as before,
but they are then done by the aid of a different faculty, which, for
the sake of distinction, we may call _Insight_. Instinct is a purely
active principle; it is seen in deeds alone; it has no power of
looking inwards; it asks no questions; it has no tendency to
discover reasons or rules; it is the opposite of Insight.
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