Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciencesWhewell, William
Philosophy
Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciences
Whewell, William
Science -- Philosophy
We cannot but reflect how widely diverse are the kinds of principles
thus set before us;--by what vast strides we mount from the lower to
the higher, as we proceed through that series of causes which the
range of the sciences thus brings under our notice. Yet we know how
narrow is the range of these sciences when compared with the whole
extent of human knowledge. We cannot doubt that on many other
subjects, besides those included in physical speculation, man has
made out solid and satisfactory trains of {253} connexion;--has
discovered clear and indisputable evidence of causation. It is
manifest, therefore, that, if we are to attempt to ascend to the
Supreme Cause--if we are to try to frame an idea of the Cause of all
these subordinate causes;--we must conceive it as more different
from any of them, than the most diverse are from each other;--more
elevated above the highest, than the highest is above the lowest.
But further;--though the Supreme Cause must thus be inconceivably
different from all subordinate causes, and immeasurably elevated
above them all, it must still include in itself all that is
essential to each of them, by virtue of that very circumstance that
it is the Cause of their Causality. Time and Space,--Infinite Time
and Infinite Space,--must be among its attributes; for we cannot but
conceive Infinite Time and Space as attributes of the Infinite Cause
of the universe. Force and Matter must depend upon it for their
efficacy; for we cannot conceive the activity of Force, or the
resistance of Matter, to be independent powers. But these are its
lower attributes. The Vital Powers, the Animal Soul, which are the
Causes of the actions of living things, are only the Effects of the
Supreme Cause of Life. And this Cause, even in the lowest forms of
organized bodies, and still more in those which stand higher in the
scale, involves a reference to Ends and Purposes, in short, to
manifest Final Causes. Since this is so, and since, even when we
contemplate ourselves in a view studiously narrowed, we still find
that we have Ideas, and Will and Personality, it would render our
philosophy utterly incoherent and inconsistent with itself, to
suppose that Personality, and Ideas, and Will, and Purpose, do not
belong to the Supreme Cause from which we derive all that we have
and all that we are.
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